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THE GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968 
WILLIAM J. VIZZARD* 
For three decades, the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) has formed the 
legal core of national gun policy in the United States.  The congressional 
deliberations leading to the passage of the GCA and companion legislation 
extended over five years and involved the Departments of Justice and 
Treasury, the White House, firearms interest groups, and both houses of 
Congress.  At no time before or since has Congress addressed gun control 
policy with as much breadth or depth.1  Although the National Firearms Act 
(NFA) of 1934 imposed strict federal regulation on machine guns and other 
“gangster” firearms2 using taxation legislation, the 1938 Federal Firearms Act 
(FFA) had proven ineffectual in asserting even minimal federal controls over 
interstate commerce in ordinary handguns, shotguns and rifles.3  The structure 
of the GCA emerged largely from observed weaknesses in the existing FFA.4 
The Dodd Hearings 
In early 1958, Senator John Kennedy of Massachusetts introduced 
legislation to control the importation of surplus military firearms.5  Clearly 
protectionist, the legislation targeted the increase in imported firearms, the 
great majority of which were military surplus.6  Congress acted only to ban the 
importation of previously exported U.S. military firearms.7  The flood of 
imports continued, fueled by surplus World War II firearms and inexpensive 
pistols and revolvers.8 
 
   * Associate Professor, Division of Criminal Justice, California State University-
Sacramento. 
 1. William J. Vizzard, The Impact of Agenda Conflict on Policy Formulation and 
Implementation: The Case of Gun Control, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 341, 344 (1995) [hereinafter 
Vizzard, Agenda].  Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 
1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 133 (1975). 
 2. 26 U.S.C. § 5848 (1958). 
 3. Zimring, supra note 1-2, at 140-43. 
 4. Id. at 140. 
 5. S. 3714, 85th Cong., (1958) (enacted). 
 6. Zimring, supra note 1-2, at 144. 
 7. 22 U.S.C. § 1934(b) (1958). 
 8. Zimring, supra note 1-2, at 144.  Id. at 145. 
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Upon assuming the chairmanship of the Juvenile Justice Subcommittee of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1961, Senator Thomas Dodd (D-CT) 
directed the staff to conduct a study of mail order sales of firearms.9  After two 
years of staff study, Senator Dodd introduced his first gun bill, Senate Bill 
1975 and opened hearings to generate public interest in the gun issue.10  The 
bill required mail-order purchasers of handguns to provide the seller a 
notarized affidavit stating they were over eighteen years of age and legally 
entitled to purchase the firearm and restricted the importation of surplus 
military firearms.11  The bill had input from the Treasury Department and 
received support from both the firearms industry and the NRA.12 
After the assassination of President Kennedy with a mail order, surplus 
military rifle, Senator Dodd amended his bill to include long guns under the 
mail order restrictions.13  The bill died in the Senate Commerce Committee in 
1964,14 but Senator Dodd reintroduced the bill as Senate Bill 14 in January of 
1965.15  Two months later, he introduced a more restrictive bill, Senate Bill 
1592, at the request of the administration, and the political battle over gun 
control began.16  Although various members of Congress introduced a variety 
of gun bills during the period between 1964 and 1968, the Dodd Bill became a 
generic description for all pending legislation, particularly among opponents of 
firearms control legislation.  Between 1938 and 1965, Congress had displayed 
little discernable interest in gun control legislation; however, external events, 
administration interest, and public opinion altered the policy dynamics within 
Congress over the next four years and opened the policy window17  Events 
during this period also foreshadowed the form and dynamics of the gun issue 
for years to come. 
The shift, by the leadership of the National Rifle Association (NRA), from 
cautious support for the original Dodd Bill to modest opposition of Senate Bill 
1592 foreshadowed the most significant and lasting change in the dynamics of 
gun control policy to occur in the twentieth century.  The NRA and firearms 
 
 9. Id. at 145. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id.  Neal Knox, The 30-Year War for Gun Ownership, GUNS AND AMMO, Aug., 1988, at 
PAGE NUMBER. 
 12. Zimring, supra note 1-2, at 146. 
 13. Id. 
 14. 110 CONG. REC. 18,431 (1964) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
 15. 111 CONG. REC. 200 (1965) (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
 16. Federal Firearms Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile 
Delinquency of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 89the Cong. 1 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 
Hearings] (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
 17. Federal Firearms Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile 
Delinquency of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 90th Cong. 3 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 
Hearings] (statement of Sen. Dodd).  1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 213 (Statement of 
Franklin Orth, NRA Executive Secretary). 
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manufacturers had supported Dodd’s original bill and the subsequent addition 
of interstate controls on long guns.18  Although the official organ of the NRA, 
The American Rifleman, indicated otherwise, the NRA leadership displayed 
some willingness to compromise with Dodd as late as 1965.19  Negative 
response by the membership precipitated a subsequent reversal of direction by 
the NRA leadership.20  This uprising by a significant portion of the NRA 
membership owed much to the development of a specialized gun press that 
catered to the most avid of gun enthusiasts.21  The editorial staffs of magazines 
such as Guns, Guns and Ammo, and Gun Week inalterably opposed gun control 
in any form and benefited from heightened interest in gun issues.22  By 1965, 
the leadership and membership of the NRA divided along a fault line 
separating those tolerant of moderate increases in gun control from those 
opposed to any significant change in the law.23  Although the NRA leadership 
responded to this internal pressure with increased opposition to new 
legislation, their policy shift failed to satisfy a powerful segment within the 
membership.  This internal dissatisfaction within the NRA provided the 
impetus for a 1977 coup by the libertarian faction within the organization and 
the ouster of the more moderate old guard.24  Although the relations between 
Chairman Dodd and the NRA witnesses remained marginally cordial during 
the 1965 hearings, the atmosphere had begun to chill.  Any hope of 
compromise between advocates of stricter gun control and the NRA ended 
after 1965. 
The 1965 hearings also shaped the future dynamics of the subcommittee.  
Over the next three years Dodd assumed the role of spokesman for a series of 
progressively more restrictive bills drafted by the administration.  Relations 
between Dodd and ranking minority member, Roman Haruska (R-NE), became 
progressively strained.25  Although his rural constituency and conservative 
 
 18. Id. at 196, 212 (statement of Franklin Orth).  1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 495 
(statement of Franklin Orth). 
 19. Knox, supra note 10-2, at PAGE NUMBER.  1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 211-12, 218 
(statement of Franklin Orth and Harlon Carter, NRA President). 
 20. Knox, supra note 10-2, at PAGE NUMBER.  1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 495 
(statement of Franklin Orth). 
 21. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 212 (statement of Sen. Dodd and Franklin Orth). 
 22. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 618, 623-27 (statement of Sen. Dodd and Thomas J. 
Siatos, Publisher and Editorial Director of Guns and Ammo Magazine).  Interview with Neal 
Knox, Reporter for Gun Week, in CITY, STATE (Mar. 1993). 
 23. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 212, 215 (statement of Franklin and Harlon Carter).  
Interview with Neal Knox, supra note 19-2. 
 24. JOSH SUGARMANN, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION: MONEY, FIREPOWER, AND FEAR 
45-52 (1992).  OSHA GRAY DAVIDSON, UNDER FIRE: THE NRA AND THE BATTLE FOR GUN 
CONTROL 34-35 (1993).  Interview with Neal Knox, supra note 19-2. 
 25. Interview with Peter W.  Velde, Minority Counsel for the Subcommittee and retained 
close ties to Senator Haruska, in Alexandria, Virginia (Mar. 22, 1993) [hereinafter VELDE], 
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view of the federal role predisposed Haruska toward a skeptical view on gun 
control, he lacked any ties to the gun lobby or any personal stake in the gun 
issue.26  Apparently, the personal relationship between Haruska and Dodd 
directly influenced committee dynamics and the formulation of policy.27 
Both the House and Senate conducted hearings on a number of proposed 
pieces of legislation between 1963 and 1968.  Although these various bills bore 
different designations during different sessions of Congress, they can be 
somewhat simplified.  The original Dodd proposal, Senate Bill 1975, would 
have restricted importation of surplus military firearms and required sworn 
affidavits of eligibility to purchase a handgun by mail.  The seller would have 
been required to mail the affidavit to the chief law enforcement officer of the 
purchaser’s jurisdiction.  Dodd reintroduced this same bill as Senate Bill 14 in 
1965, and Haruska again introduced essentially the same bill as Senate Bill 
1853 in 1967.28  Although Dodd introduced Senate Bill 14, he soon shifted his 
support and the attention of his subcommittee hearings to Senate Bill 1592, a 
bill largely drafted by the administration.  The majority of the 1965 gun control 
hearings concerned this bill; which prohibited interstate mail order sales and 
interstate over-the-counter sales of handguns to individuals, increased dealer 
fees from one to 100 dollars, extended controls to ammunition, restricted 
destructive devices and prohibited sales by dealers to minors.29  Existing law 
already prohibited sales by dealers to felons and certain other classes of 
persons. 
The Administration Ups the Ante 
In 1967, Dodd reintroduced Senate Bill, 1592 as Senate Bill 1 but soon 
introduced Amendment 90 to Senate Bill 1 (hereafter “Senate Bill 1 as 
amended”) in response to administration proposals.  Rather than amending the 
existing Federal Firearms Act, Senate Bill 1 as amended replaced the FFA with 
a new law.  It also extended the interstate prohibition on mail order sales of 
 
noting that the acrimony is often apparent between Senators Dodd and Haruska on both a 
personal and philosophical level during the hearings.  See Federal Firearms Act, 1968: Hearings 
on S. 3604 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Comm. of the Senate 
Judiciary, 90th Cong. 592-93 (1968) (statement of James Bennett, President, National Council for 
a National Firearms Policy) [hereinafter 1968 Hearings].  See also, ROBERT SHERRILL, 
SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL 68-69 (1973). 
 26. VELDE, supra note 22-1.  “My review of Haruska’s statements in committee support 
Velde’s view and my research revealed no documentation linking Haruska to the NRA.”  Id. 
 27. Id.  Velde contended the Haruska’s opposition to much of Todd’s legislation resulted 
largely from his dislike of Dodd and his belief that attempting to steam roll over minority 
objections.  A review of Haruska’s questioning during several years of hearings also reveals a 
very strong emphasis on the rural perspective and concern for the impact of law on individuals.  
Id. 
 28. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 12-15.  1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 20-23, 31. 
 29. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 6-12. 
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handguns to all guns and prohibited interstate transactions between individuals.  
Senate Bill 1 as amended also reduced dealer license fees to twenty-five 
dollars and removed controls on ammunition.30  A companion bill, Senate Bill 
1854, placed destructive devices under the NFA as items requiring registration 
and tax payment.31  Senator Haruska had advanced this approach for some time 
in lieu of placing such items in the FFA. 
Senator Haruska’s reintroduction of the original Dodd bill as Senate Bill 
1853 provided a compromise position for Senators fearing constituencies on 
both ends of the gun issue.  With strong NRA opposition to Senate Bill 1 as 
amended and an alternative bill to divide support, the probability of passing a 
comprehensive gun bill appeared low.  External events suddenly altered the 
policy agenda.  The assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. opened the 
policy window and altered the political dynamics in the Judiciary Committee.32  
On April 29, 1968, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out a bill 
resembling Dodd’s Senate Bill 1 as amended, with the exception of a ban on 
interstate sales of long guns, as Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act (hereafter Title IV).33  On May 23, 1968, the full Senate 
amended the Omnibus bill by adding Title VII (hereafter Title VII), which 
prohibited felons and certain other classes of individuals from receiving, 
possessing or transporting a firearm in or affecting commerce.34  The Senate 
passed Senate Bill 917 as amended, the Omnibus Act, on May 24, 1968, and 
sent it to the House.35  The policy window had opened in the Senate, but the 
House remained a potential obstacle. 
Breakthrough 
A second assassination pried open further the policy window and assured 
House passage.  On June 5, 1968, an assessin murdered presidential candidate 
and United States Senator Robert Kennedy.  The following day, the House 
passed the Omnibus Act, including Titles IV and VII.36  Ironically, after years 
in formulation Title IV never became effective.  Before the effective date of 
implementation, Congress passed the somewhat more comprehensive GCA.37  
 
 30. 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 124-27. 
 31. Id. at 24. 
 32. VELDE, supra note 22-1.  Velde stated that the committee was engaged in marking up 
Haruska’s as Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Bill, and that the full committee was evenly divided 
between the supporters of the Haruska bill and the Dodd bill, with Chairman Eastland favoring 
the Haruska bill.  After the assassination, two proxy votes shifted the balance in favor of Dodd’s 
bill, which the committee passed after deleting restrictions on interstate long gun sales. 
 33. S. Rep. No. 90-1097 at 1, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. 
 34. 114 CONG. REC. 14775 (daily ed. May 23, 1968). 
 35. Id. at 14798. 
 36. Id. at 16300. 
 37. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1214 (Oct. 22, 1968). 
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The GCA extended interstate restrictions to all firearms and incorporated 
ammunition.38  It also revised the NFA by the addition of destructive devices 
to the restricted categories and by restricting future registrations of firearms 
made or transferred in violation of the law.39 
Although Title IV of the Omnibus Act and the later GCA reflected 
extensive hearings and staff work, Title VII benefited from no such history.  At 
the last minute, the Senate inserted Title VII into its version of the Omnibus 
Act by voice vote.40  Proposed by Senator Russell Long (D-LA) and 
considered without hearings, the bill suffered from poor drafting which would 
bedevil its enforcers and confound the courts.41  Title VII addressed simple 
firearm possession for the first time at the federal level.  The bill included a 
finding that strongly implied such intent,42 and Senator Long’s statements on 
the Senate floor likewise support such an interpretation.43  Apparently, a bill 
intended to significantly alter federal policy became law with little analysis 
largely as a political favor to improve its author’s image as tough on crime.44 
The new momentum generated by the Robert Kennedy assassination 
continued to alter the political dynamics of the gun control issue through the 
summer and fall of 1968.  In earlier years, congressional mail, dominated by 
gun control opponents, generated fear even among many liberal members of 
supporting significant legislation.45  Although opinion polls reflected broad-
based support for stricter controls on firearms, this support failed to translate 
 
 38. Id. § 921(a)(3). 
 39. Id. § 921(a)(4). 
 40. 114 CONG. REC. 14775 (daily ed. May 23, 1968). 
 41. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).  The court contributed the following 
observation: “the statute does not read well under either view”.  Id. at 339.  The court also 
observed that “the legislative history of (the) Act hardly speaks with that clarity of purpose which 
Congress supposedly furnishes courts”.  Id. at 346, citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 
U.S. 474, 483 (1951).  Finally, the court reiterated the government’s contention that “the statute is 
not a model of logic or clarity.  Id. at 347. 
 42. See id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 43. See 114 CONG. REC. 14773-75 (daily ed. May 23, 1968) (response of Sen. Long to Sen. 
McClellan). 
 44. VELDE, supra note 22-1.  Velde stated that Sen. Long made a personal appeal to his 
colleagues for last minute inclusion of Title VII into the Omnibus bill without a hearing based on 
his perception of needs for the next election.  According to Velde, subsequent changes were to be 
made in committee but the law was passed on a voice vote and no changes could be made.  Some 
Senators and staff members considered the section of the law making possession of a firearm by 
the employee of a felon unconstitutional.  See also, 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 69 
(statement of Ramsey Clark, U.S. Attorney General).  See also, Stevens v. United States, 440 
F.2d 144 (1971) (thoroughly reviewing the legislative history of the bill). 
 45. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 422 (statement of Sen. Joseph Tydings).  Id. at 1099 
(statement of Sen. George McGovern). 
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into constituent demand.46  After the 1968 assassinations of Robert Kennedy 
and Martin Luther King a groundswell of visible support for more decisive 
federal action temporarily materialized.47 
During the summer of 1968, gun control advocates in Congress tested the 
limits of the new policy dynamics with the introduction of bills calling for 
registration and licensing of firearms.48  Senator Joseph Tydings (D-MD), who 
replaced Senator Dodd as the most visible congressional proponent of gun 
control over the next two years,49 introduced one of four major bills relating to 
registration and licensing.  Senate Bill 3634 would have established national 
firearm registration and required a license issued by the Secretary of Treasury 
to possess a firearm. The bill allowed the states to substitute state licensing for 
federal licensing.  The administration advanced Senate Bill 3691, which 
mandated federal licensing if the states failed to act.50  The Administration 
proposed the use of licensed federal firearm dealers as licensing agents, 
following the pattern of hunting and fishing licenses.51  The Administration bill 
contained two cumbersome requirements: that applicants provide certification 
from a doctor regarding their mental state and certification from the local 
police regarding their residence and lack of criminal record.  Similar in 
structure and intent, Senate Bill 3634 and Senate Bill 3691 both allowed and 
encouraged the states to develop firearms owner licensing but mandated 
federal licensing if the states failed to act.52 
Senator Edward Brooke (R-MA) and Senator Dodd also introduced 
registration bills of less sweeping proportions.  Brooke’s bill, Senate Bill 3637, 
required registration through local police authorities but not a license to 
possess a firearm.  Dodd’s bill, Senate Bill 3604, also required registration but 
contained no licensing provisions. 
Following the passage of the Omnibus Act, the Dodd subcommittee 
continued gun control hearings focused almost exclusively on these 
registration and licensing bills.53  Although the summer of 1968 marked the 
high water mark for gun control on the national policy agenda, none of the 
 
 46. See The Gallop Organization, Eight in Ten Persons Favor Law Requiring Police Permit 
for Gun, PUB. OPINION NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 12, 1964). 
 47. 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 579-82 (statement of James Bennett, President, 
National Council for Responsible Firearm Policy); Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Dodd). 
 48. Gun Controls Extended to Long Guns, Ammunition, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 
ANNUAL ALMANAC 225 (1969). 
 49. Tydings was defeated in 1970 with considerable opposition form gun interests.  
Although the impact of his support for gun control on the election remains unclear, the defeat 
came to symbolize the risk of supporting gun control for the next twenty years. 
 50. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 57-59 (statement of Attorney General Ramsey 
Clark).  S. 3634 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).  S. 3691 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). 
 51. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 58. 
 52. Id. at 59. 
 53. 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2. 
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registration bills came close to passage.  In October, Congress passed the GCA 
to replace Title IV of the Omnibus Act after a spirited debate in both the House 
and Senate and a flurry of motions by both supporters and opponents of gun 
control.54  The GCA constituted the last major gun control bill to pass 
Congress until the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, which reduced a 
number of the controls imposed by the GCA.55  Not until the Brady Act of 
1994, would Congress again pass significant control legislation.56  The final 
bill constituted only a modest revision of the already passed Title IV of the 
Omnibus Act. 
The Law 
The GCA actually consisted of two distinct subdivisions or titles, located 
in different titles of the federal code.57  In addition, Title VII of the Omnibus 
Act (hereafter Title VII) was the functional equivalent of a third subdivision of 
the GCA, although it constituted a separate piece of legislation.58  The majority 
of the GCA, Title I (hereafter the GCA), regulated all firearms and was located 
in Title 18 of the Untied States Code (the Criminal Code) as was Title VII.  
Title II (hereafter the NFA) incorporated the existing National Firearms Act, 
with minor additions.  The NFA remained a tax statute, in law if not in fact, 
within Title 26 of the United States Code (the Internal Revenue Code).  It 
retained the existing scheme of registration to enforce the making, transfer 
taxes and special occupational taxes required by the 1934 Act.59  The primary 
changes to the NFA consisted of the addition of  destructive devices to the 
previously enumerated categories of so called gangster weapons, and the 
termination of authority to register existing NFA firearms after an initial 
amnesty period.60  The category of destructive devices included weapons with 
a bore exceeding one-half inch in diameter, explosive and poison gas bombs, 
projectiles with explosive warheads and rockets and missiles.61  While this 
change attracted little attention at the time, it conferred upon the Bureau of 
 
 54. ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 144-45 (1995). 
 55. Vizzard, Agenda, supra note 1, at 344. 
 56. Id. at 343. 
 57. The use of title is somewhat confusing in this context.  Normally used to refer to separate 
federal codes, it concurrently defines subdivisions in the act. 
 58. Ultimately incorporated into a single act, the GCA and Title VII ware routinely viewed 
as one piece of legislation by those implementing the law. 
 59. The NFA did not prohibit machine guns and other regulated firearms but imposed a $200 
tax on the making or transfer of such weapons.  The law included registration provisions to assure 
the payment of the tax in advance.  Special occupational tax payers, dealers, and manufacturers, 
could pay a yearly tax that exempted them from the tax on individual weapons but not from 
registration requirements.  See 26 U.S.C. 53 (YEAR). 
 60. The firearms originally covered by 26 U.S.C. 5845 included machine guns, silencers, 
short-barreled rifles, shotguns, and other unique fire arms. 
 61. 26 U.S.C. 5845(f) (1968). 
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Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) jurisdiction over the primary federal 
law relating to bombing.62  Although future legislation expanded the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) over bombings, ATF 
retained joint jurisdiction in this area and later extended that jurisdiction into 
commercial arson.63 
Between 1934 and 1968, Treasury Department policy allowed persons 
without criminal records to register NFA firearms possessed in technical 
violation of the law when the violation was not willfull nor the firearm in 
violation of state law.64  The new law provided for a thirty-day amnesty period 
during which any person possessing an NFA firearm could register it without 
restrictions.65  No information provided in furtherance of registration could be 
released to state authorities or used to prosecute the registrant for any crime 
other than false statements in the registration application.66  The amnesty and 
nondisclosure provisions overcame the defense of self incrimination 
established by Haynes v. U.S.67  While this legal strategy served to eliminate a 
short term impediment to enforcing the registration provisions of the NFA, it 
established a precedent that may prove troublesome in any future effort to 
pursue general registration or licensing of firearms.68 
Although the GCA created no comprehensive system of control or 
regulation of firearms in the possession of individual citizens, it significantly 
altered the rules governing commercial firearms transactions.  It prohibited 
engaging in the business of manufacturing, importing or dealing in firearms 
without first obtaining a federal license.69  Licensees were prohibited from 
selling firearms to out-of-state residents, minors, felons, persons under 
indictment for felonies, fugitives and certain other categories of persons70 and 
required to maintain records of all sales.71  The law prohibited interstate mail 
 
 62. WILLIAM J. VIZZARD, IN THE CROSS FIRE, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE BUREAU OF 
ALCOHOL TOBACCO AND FIREARMS 40-41 (1997) [hereinafter VIZZARD, Cross Fire]. 
 63. Id. at 64. 
 64. Author’s experience as Special Investigator with Alcohol, Tobacco Tax Division in 1967 
and 1968. 
 65. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1214 (Oct. 22, 1968). 
 66. 26 U.S.C. 5848(a) (1968). 
 67. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).  Possessors could no longer claim that the 
act of registration would subject them to risk of prosecution, thus requiring self-incrimination. 
 68. The justification for any national firearms registration and licensing system depends 
largely upon the utility of the registration information for general law enforcement.  See William 
J. Vizzard, A Systematic Approach to Controlling Firearm Markets, J. FIREARMS & PUBLIC 
POL’Y (1997).  This precedent if extended to a general registration scheme, would preclude use of 
that information. 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(a) (Lexis 1999). 
 70. Id. § 922(b)(1)-(3).  Id. § 922(d). 
 71. Id. § 922(b)(5). 
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order sales and tightly restricted intrastate mail order sales.72  Manufacturers 
and importers had to begin identifying every firearm by stamping the name of 
the manufacturer or importer and a serial number on the receiver.73  Firearms 
not suitable for sporting purposes and surplus military firearms were restricted 
from importation.74 
The GCA prohibited dealers from delivering firearms to felons and several 
other categories of persons and those same classes of persons from receiving 
firearms that had moved in commerce,75 but failed to address possession by 
these persons.  The GCA also ignored transfers by individuals to felons and 
other restricted categories, while prohibiting transfers to out of state 
residents.76  Title VII prohibited felons and certain other categories of persons 
from receiving, possessing or transporting firearms in commerce; however, the 
categories enumerated by Title VII differed slightly from those in the GCA.77  
In addition, the question of whether Title VII applied to simple possession 
remained unanswered for several years.  Following the passage of Title VII, 
the Departments of Treasury and Justice assumed a very cautious posture 
toward prosecution of felons for possession of firearms.  Until the 1971 
decision in United States v. Bass (hereafter Bass),78 policy virtually precluded 
federal prosecution of felons for possession of firearms except in cases where 
the government could directly prove interstate transportation or receipt by the 
defendant.79  Even after Bass, prosecutorial policy remained conservative until 
1977, when the Supreme Court affirmed that prior interstate movement of a 
firearm fulfilled the “in or effecting commerce” element of possession.80 
Although subsequent statutory changes merged the prohibitions against 
possession of firearms “in or affecting commerce” by felons and others into the 
 
 72. Id. § 922(a)(2).  Id. § 922(c). 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 923(i). 
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3). 
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d).  Id. § 922(h).  The excepting persons being under 18 years of age for 
long guns and under 21 years of age for handguns.  No restriction on receipt existed for these 
classes. 
 76. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5). 
 77. 18 U.S.C. Appx. 1202(a) (repleaded 1986) applied to persons who had been covicted of 
a felony, dishonorably discharged for the armed forces, adjudicated mentally incompetent, 
renounced their citizenship or who were aliens unlawfully in the country.  Section 922(h) applied 
to persons who were under indictment for or convicted of a crime punishable by more than one 
year imprisonment, fugitives from justice, unlawful users of prohibited drugs, adjudicated 
mentally defective, or committed to a metal institution. 
 78. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).  Although the Court adopted a restrictive view of the 
statutory wording that required the government to prove “possession in commerce,” a footnote in 
the decision suggested that prior movement of the firearm in interstate commerce would fulfill 
that element.  This provided the government with a practical means of charging possession in 
most cases. 
 79. Based upon the author’s experience as a Special Agent with the ATF during those years. 
 80. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977). 
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GCA,81 Title VII provided the only functional federal restriction on possession 
for almost a decade.  Even the incorporation of the prohibition into the GCA 
did not address the complexities raised by the need for proof of interstate 
nexus.  Section 922(g) of 18 U.S.C. simply incorporated the same, [possess in 
or affecting commerce,” language that previously existed in Section 1202(a)].  
Thus the requirement to establish interstate nexus in every case, adopted as a 
result of Bass, remained.  Although evidence of prior interstate shipment 
ordinarily fills the “affecting commerce” requirement, firearms seized in their 
state of manufacture constitute an exception.82  The ambiguous syntax of the 
original Title VII and the failure of its congressional finding to satisfy the 
interstate requirement have resulted in law that neither restricts its reach to true 
commerce nor efficiently addresses all possession.  The perpetuation and 
incorporation of the possession restriction demonstrates an apparent 
congressional intent to establish a federal prohibition against firearm 
possession by felon and certain other high risk offenders, yet this intent has not 
translated into corrective legislation to address the faults incorporated in the 
1968 law.83 
In addition to not directly addressing the possession of firearms by high-
risk classes, the GCA provided no authorization for an oversight mechanism to 
insure that licensed dealers did not transfer firearms to such persons.  Although 
dealers were required to maintain a record of gun disposition and obtain 
identification and a signed certification of eligibility from the purchaser, they 
had no means for determining eligibility.84  While the original GCA required 
dealers to submit such reports as the Secretary might require, the Treasury 
Department made no effort to include a reporting requirement on sales in the 
implementing regulations.85  The Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986 
specifically prohibited such a requirement,86 and the Brady Law of 1994 
instituted required reporting for the sole purpose of screening buyers.87 
The preamble to the GCA defined its purpose as providing support to state 
efforts at firearm regulation without placing a burden on legitimate firearm 
users.88  These themes dominated the entire law.  The first theme appeared in 
 
 81. 18 U.S.C. § 933(g). 
 82. On some occasions, manufacturers ship to wholesalers in another state, who ship the 
firearm back to the state of origin.  In these cases, prior interstate movement can be documented 
through dealer records. 
 83. The improvisation of investigators and prosecutors has reduced pressure to address the 
problems of drafting.  Most firearms have traveled in interstate commerce and thus meet the 
current standard of federal nexus. 
 84. See 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A) (requiring maintenance of records prescribed by the 
Secretary); 27 C.F.R. § 178.121(H) (1999) (specifying the required records). 
 85. Interview with Rex Davis, former ATF Director, in CITY, STATE (Mar. 23, 1993). 
 86. 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A). 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s). 
 88. § 101 (titled Purpose of Public Law 90-618). 
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the provisions prohibiting acquisition outside one’s state of residence, 
interstate mail order sales, and delivery to out-of-state residents or persons who 
would be in violation of local or state law by possessing such a firearm.  The 
second theme appears in a number of provisions including: exemptions for 
purchase of guns in contiguous states, provisions for intrastate mail order sales 
by dealers, and provision for replacement of guns lost or broken by non-
residents on hunting trips.  Presumably, this concern about placing burdens on 
individuals accounts for the lack of controls on transactions between 
individuals.  Concerns about the burden of licensing on small rural businesses 
manifested themselves in the ten dollar yearly license fee and concerns for 
collectors resulted in the collector license for curios and relics.89 
Structural Issues 
A fundamental deficiency in the law resulted from the failure to define the 
term “engaged in the business of dealing in firearms”.  Although the law 
required any person engaged in this activity to obtain a license and provided 
felony penalties for failure to do so,90 it included no definition or statutory 
presumption to clarify this crucial term.  This lack of definition was the source 
of much of the subsequent conflict over the implementation of the law and 
generated considerable difficulties for gun enthusiasts and law enforcement.91  
The ambiguity resulting from a failure to define “engaging in the business” 
interfaced with other structural shortcomings to generate years of conflict over 
the entire licensing process.92  The law required the issuance of a dealer license 
within sixty days to any applicant declaring an intention to engage in the 
business from a premises, unless the applicant was under 21 years of age or fell 
into the one of the categories of persons prohibited from possessing firearms.93  
These minimal criteria, combined with a license fee of only ten dollars per 
year, assured issuance of licenses to numerous individuals desiring the 
convenience of a license but lacking actual intent to engage in a legitimate 
business enterprise.94  Because Congress granted no discretion in the issuance 
of licenses, the ATF could address this issue only after an inspection had 
revealed a failure to engage in the business.  This placed ATF in the awkward 
position of revoking or denying renewal of a license for failing to engage in the 
 
 89. 18 U.S.C. § 923(b).  27 C.F.R. § 178.11 (defines curios and relics). 
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1). 
 91. VIZZARD, Cross Fire, supra note 59, at 67-68. 
 92. Id.  See also Phillip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 § J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 59, 75-76 (1995). 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 923(d)(2). 
 94. Possession of a license allows an individual to order firearms directly from a variety of 
wholesalers, often at substantial savings. 
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business rather than for some intentional violation of the law or the 
regulations.95 
Although many license applicants had no intent of carrying on a 
commercial enterprise, many persons who actually sold firearms commercially 
resisted licensing and its requirements to conduct business from a fixed 
premises and maintain records of purchasers.96  Thus, ATF found itself 
concurrently prosecuting unlicensed dealers for what appeared to be casual 
sales, while encouraging other casual sellers to surrender their licenses.  The 
results proved disastrous for ATF, although the contradictions existed more in 
appearances than fact.97  These problems could have easily been avoided with 
higher dealer fees, a definition of “engaging in business” based on the number 
of sales or offers per year, modest licensing discretion and elimination of the 
requirement that licensees engage in the business.98  Efforts at minimizing the 
burden on licensees and restriction of bureaucratic discretion generated serious 
implementation problems. 
As with many federal regulatory statutes, the GCA granted authority to the 
ATF to promulgate regulations spelling out specific procedures under the 
law.99  While regulatory agencies may exercise significant discretionary 
authority through administrative regulations, this has not proven the case for 
the regulations authorized under the GCA.  The regulations restrict themselves 
to filling in routine details for activities spelled out in the law.  In light of the 
hostile congressional reaction to the only effort at utilizing the regulations to 
increase the reach of the statute, the narrow drafting appears to reflect 
congressional will.100 
Thus, the GCA and Title VII imposed procedures on persons in the gun 
business and established classifications for persons ineligible to receive and 
possess firearms from dealers or in interstate commerce.  With the exception of 
the NFA restrictions on machine guns and certain other unusual firearms, the 
law applied to all modern firearms equally.101  Individuals, other than felons 
and certain other prohibited persons, were affected little, by the law.  Although 
most persons could not acquire a firearm outside their state of residence, only a 
 
 95. VIZZARD, Cross Fire, supra note 59, at 67.  The ATF never pursued a policy of 
revocation, but routinely refused to renew licenses.  More often they convinced the licensee to 
surrender his license voluntarily. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 66-68. 
 98. The purpose of regulatory law and licensing is to assure compliance with procedures or 
competency.  The desire or lack thereof to make sales is an irrational criterion for qualification.  
A fee adequate to cover issuing and inspection costs would have limited the number of licenses 
without placing the government in this irrational position. 
 99. See 18 U.S.C. § 926(a); 27 C.F.R. §§ 178, 179 (contains regulations). 
 100. VIZZARD, Cross Fire, supra note 59, at 55-56. 
 101. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a). 
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small minority of persons desired to do so.102  The law terminated the nation’s 
totally laissez faire policy on gun commerce.  Although proceeded by 
extensive hearings, the law generated numerous implementation problems. 
In Retrospect 
Events surrounding the passage of the GCA provide some insight to the 
policy process and the nature of gun control as an issue.  From the interest 
group perspective, the events present a rather straight forward and well-defined 
scenario with the groups divided into two fairly discreet camps.  The events 
differed from a classic clash of interest groups only in that the pro-control 
advocates included neither a broad-based organization specifically committed 
to gun control or any organization with an economic stake.  The only 
organized special interest group solely devoted to gun control, the National 
Council for Responsible Firearms Policy, consisted of only about fifty 
prominent, though not essentially powerful, citizens.103  Although the pro-
control position received some support from groups with more widespread 
membership, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Policy (IACP) 
and the American Bar Association, these groups pursued a variety of interests 
and issues other than firearms.104  The pro-control forces did enjoy two key 
sources of support.  The Johnson Administration consistently supported a more 
comprehensive federal gun statute, although the Justice Department provided 
more support than did the Treasury Department.  Justice lawyers drafted the 
most restrictive proposals, and Justice officials testified in their support.  
Although less active on policy formulation, Treasury officials consistently 
supported the administration position.105  The advocates of control also 
enjoyed widespread support in most of the national media.106 
 
 102. The combination of excluding firearms manufactured before 1898 and creating a 
collector license for firearms over 50 years old allowed substantial interstate shipment of collector 
arms.  Individuals could also obtain firearms from out of state by having them shipped through a 
dealer in the state of acquisition. 
 103. See 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 841.  (statement of Leonard S. Blondes, Vice 
President of the National Council for a Responsible Firearms Policy). 
 104. Representatives of both groups appeared on several occasions before Congressional 
committees in support of the Dodd bills and IACP supported both licensing and registration.  See 
1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 526 (statement of Quinn Tamm). 
 105. A reading of testimony by Justice and Treasury representatives reflects that Justice was 
clearly in the lead on policymaking while Treasury was more focused on details of 
implementation.  At congressional hearings, Justice was extensively represented by the Attorney 
General while an Assistant Secretary or the Commissioner of Internal revenue usually represented 
Treasury.  Justice’s dominant policy role became most clear in 1968 with the introduction of 
licensing and registration proposals. 
 106. See Rep. John V. Lindsay, Speaking Out—Too Many People Have Guns, SATURDAY 
EVENING POST, Feb. 1, 1964 at 12.  Fire at Will, WASH. POST., June 26, 1968, at A1.  Guns Must 
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The opponents more closely approached the classic interest group model.  
First among equals, the NRA benefited directly from the heightened interest 
generated by the legislative hearings and debates.  Its membership rose rapidly 
during this period, reaching 700,000 by 1965 and 1,000,000 by 1968.107  
Although it supported Senator Haruska’s bill as an alternative to more 
restrictive legislation, the NRA solidified its position of leadership in 
opposition to all other control proposals with support from associations of arms 
collectors, manufacturer and shooters.  The membership of these groups 
overlapped substantially, in fact, most members of these other groups were 
likely NRA members.108  Although some have characterized the opposition as 
a classic economic interest group with the NRA acting as a front for arms 
manufacturers, the record provides little support for this interpretation.109 
In the case of gun control during the 1960’s, the interest groups, or factions 
in Madison’s words, did not resemble the general concept of interest groups 
based on economic interest, class interest, geography or ethnicity.  Control 
advocates consisted of a loosely organized elite, focused on a perceived public 
interest issue with support from the administration and presumably from much 
of the public.  Although principally composed of narrow special interest 
groups, control opponents enjoyed a very broad-based support that did not 
grow primarily from economic self-interest.  While this support was most 
concentrated in rural areas it spanned class and geography. 
Advocates for both positions utilized similar strategies to prevail.  Political 
theorist E. E. Schattschneider characterized advocates in the American political 
system as expanding political conflicts by attempting to bring the audience into 
the conflict.110  Both sides followed this pattern.  The advocates used the press 
and the hearings themselves to create demand for legislation.  The opposition 
utilized the special interest press and direct mailings for the same purpose, 
 
Go, ADVERTISING AGE, June 17, 1968, at 1.  James V. Bennett, The Gun and How to Control It, 
N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE., Sept. 25, 1996, at 34. 
 107. 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 212 (statement of Franklin Orth).  1968 Hearings, 
supra note 22-2, at 399 (statement of Harold Glassen). 
 108. In the author’s experience virtually all competitive shooters and arms collectors are NRA 
members.  Although many hunters are not, those who are members of outdoors associations likely 
are.  In some cases, those who testified for those groups also held key positions in the NRA.  See 
1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 296 (statement of C. R. Gutermuth, Vice President of Wildlife 
Management Institute). 
 109. The Dodd bill restricted imports of firearms, a benefit for domestic manufacturers, yet 
the NRA consistently opposed the bill.  The Dodd bill also potentially benefited retailers of 
firearms and ammunition by controlling mail order sales, thus reducing competition for most 
retailers.  On the first day of the 1968 hearings, Sen. Dodd announced the support of several 
manufacturers of firearms.  See 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 2.  This constituted a major 
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often times characterizing the proposed legislation as being far more restrictive 
than it in fact was.111 
The crime control paradigm dominated and framed the policy 
discussion.112  In the early hearings, the impact on crime of sales to out-of-state 
residents by mail order and over the counter transactions received considerable 
attention.113  As hearings progressed, advocates repeatedly stressed the number 
of killings with guns and rising crime rates.  The evidence most cited was the 
low crime rates in nations with strong gun control laws and the relatively low 
homicide rate in New York and other high control environments compared to 
Houston, Phoenix, and other low control cities.114  Advocates also raised 
sovereignty and social order arguments when addressing militant groups and 
the riots.115  The examination of interstate movement of firearms to thwart state 
restrictions more closely approximated policy analysis than did other testimony 
to the various committees. 
Destructive devices and machine guns received substantial attention in the 
1965 Senate hearings, even though there was very little controversy about 
controlling the former and the latter was already under federal legal control.116  
After the reports of sniping during the Newark and Detroit riots the focus 
shifted more toward social order.117  On occasions, proponents challenged the 
most sacred sovereignty argument of opponents by questioning their 
interpretation of the Second Amendment as an absolute, individual right.118  
They did not, however, rely heavily upon a sovereignty argument, even when 
opponents continually cited potential impact on hypothetical individuals.  
Advocates showed little interest in challenging the legitimacy of applying 
individual level analysis to public policy or the language of individual rights.  
Instead, they generally attempted to minimize the potential impact of proposals 
on individuals.  No doubt, this reflected the discomfort most American feel 
with collective rights and state authority. 
 
 111. See NRA bulletin (Apr. 9, 1965) (in reference to S. 1592). 
 112. See VIZZARD, supra note 1, at 345 for a detailed description of the four paradigms of 
gun control: sovereignty, cultural, crime control, and public health. 
 113. See 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 274-81 (statement of Carl Miller, Chicago Police 
Dept.), at 343-73 (statement of Richard R. Caples, Comm., Dept. of Pub. Safety, Boston, Mass.), 
at 394-407 (statement of Arthur J. Sills, Attorney General) and at 495-503 (statement of James V. 
Bennett). 
 114. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 615-57 (statement of Ramsey Clark), at 88-103 
(statement of John V. Lindsay) and at 113-18 (statement of John Glenn, Jr.). 
 115. 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 997-99 (statement of Richard J. Hughes). 
 116. See 1965 Hearings, supra note 13, at 133-60 (statement of Merton Howe) and at 160-
185 (statement of J. C. Gonzalez). 
 117. See 1967 Hearings, supra note 14, at 997-1030 (statement of Richard J. Hughes) and at 
1052-1062 (statement of Quinn Tamm). 
 118. 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 566 (statement of Lawrence Speiser). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1999] THE GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968 95 
Gun control opponents also addressed the crime control paradigm with 
arguments that criminals would never comply with any gun law and cited the 
homicide rate in low control cities such as Milwaukee.119  Yet opponents 
proved far more willing than advocates to shift from crime control to other 
conceptual frameworks.  The favorite argument was the sovereignty/individual 
rights paradigm.  Although opponents occasionally used self-defense as a 
means of invoking this context, they more often addressed individual rights.  
Repeatedly, opponents characterized the impact of proposed legislation as 
denying rights to individual gun owners.120  In addition, opponents argued that 
the federal government would be intruding into the sovereignty of the states.121  
Curiously, some opponents concurrently advocated HR6137, a bill that would 
have made virtually every violent crime involving a firearm a federal 
offense.122  For opponents, several key symbols were clearly of paramount 
importance.  New York’s Sullivan Law provided the ultimate symbol of 
evil.123  The symbol took on added importance during the period when New 
Jersey passed a permissive licensing law that covered both long guns and 
handguns.124  Opponents repeatedly invoked the symbols of freedom, 
individual rights and the Constitution.  During the 1965 hearings, advocates 
displayed destructive devices such as rocket launchers, presumably in an effort 
to symbolically demonize the firearm trade. 
No clear winner emerged from the gun control policy battle of the 1960s.  
Control advocates succeeded in passing the GCA, largely due to events 
external to the policy arena.  At first inspection, the law appears to constitute a 
significant policy shift.  Measured by impact, however, the policy shift appears 
more incremental than radical.  At the law’s passage, control advocates 
expressed concern with the fact that over 100,000 individuals and corporations 
held federal firearms licenses, and that at least a quarter of these licensees were 
not legitimately engaged in business.125  Nearly three decades later, the number 
of dealer licenses had increased nearly three-fold with the majority still issued 
 
 119. See 1968 Hearings, supra note 22-2, at 468-526 (statement of Rep. John Dingell). 
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to persons not legitimately engaged in business.126  The volume of firearm 
sales continued to increase after the passage of the law,127 and few effective 
restrictions were placed on unlicensed traffickers in firearms.128  Although 
activity by both advocates and opponents declined briefly with the passage of 
the GCA, soon both sides renewed their activities. 
The failure to pass more restrictive and comprehensive legislation, despite 
the alignment of public opinion, a sympathetic press and active administration 
support, raises a most interesting policy question.  Although many have 
attributed this result entirely to the institutional power of the NRA, the record 
suggests more complex answers.  At the Senate subcommittee level, personal 
conflicts between the ranking minority and majority members prevented 
compromise.129  The full committee split evenly between support and 
opposition, but the chair opposed gun control.130  Since the primary momentum 
for action resided in the Senate, this severely reduced the probability of a more 
restrictive bill emerging from committee. 
The Senate presented particular structural problems for gun control 
legislation.  The issue broke down largely on rural versus urban lines.  The 
structure of the Senate provided rural legislators disproportionate power to 
prevent passage of strict controls.  A review of the hearings reveals that 
numerous Senators and House Members from rural states felt a need to not 
only oppose the Dodd and Administration bills but also to testify in committee 
against them.131  The intense personal opposition of a few key members, such 
as John Dingell and Robert Sikes, reinforced the existing ideological and 
political reservations of their rural and conservative cohorts.132  An additional 
center of resistance formed around ideological conservatives.  For example, 
Strom Thurmond and Roman Haruska who opposed the prevailing view that 
the Interstate Commerce Clause could be interpreted to give the federal 
government power over acts within states.133 
None of these obstacles might have proven insurmountable if public 
opinion had been translated into a focused demand for action, but it did not.  
With the exception of the short period after the Robert Kennedy assassination, 
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the public displayed little active interest in the issue.  Because opposition 
crossed party lines, party discipline proved ineffective for advancing control 
legislation, as it has until the early 1990s.134  Much as with civil rights before 
the 1960s, a few key Democrats from southern and rural areas proved critical 
to the opposition even when the Administration strongly supported a bill. 
No doubt, the lack of preparation and organization on the part of policy 
advocates, the administration and the bureaucracy played a significant role in 
limiting their policy success.  Political scientist Nelson Polsby cited the failure 
to pass more significant firearms legislation in 1968 as a classic example of 
failure of a policy initiative due to inadequate preparation by advocates.135  The 
advocates lacked organization, and Vietnam and the War on Poverty occupied 
the majority of the administration’s interest and resources.  The jurisdictional 
split between Treasury and Justice exacerbated the lack of preparation and 
policy coordination by the bureaucracy. 
That the passage of the GCA did not mark the beginning of an incremental 
process of increasing control seems less surprising in retrospect than many 
would have believed at the time.  In many ways, 1968 marked the official end 
of an era.  The election of Richard Nixon signaled the reversal of a trend 
toward an expanded federal role in domestic social policy, which began with 
the 1932 election of Franklin Roosevelt.  Although Nixon’s rhetoric on 
decentralizing domestic policymaking and reversing the federal government 
activism may have exceeded his actions, momentum had shifted.  After a 
caretaker Ford Administration, Jimmy Carter attained the presidency by 
campaigning against the Washington bureaucracy, only to be defeated four 
years later by the ultimate symbol of decentralization, Ronald Reagan.  The 
1970s brought the abolition of federal controls over airline fares and service, 
shipping rates and saving and loan operations.  Scholars began to question the 
assumptions of interest group liberalism, and, by the end of the decade, many 
embraced public choice theory. 
Rather than the next incremental steps in gun control, the decade of the 
1970s would see government emphasis shift toward implementation of existing 
law, while interest groups, on both sides, solidified and intensified their 
positions.136  If the measure of a policy change is the degree to which it 
changes social behavior, then the policy changes of 1968 were modest. 
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